The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Under this view the _minds_ of men and of other animals are specialised
specks, as it were, of a vast ocean of _thought_, to which they bear a
like inconspicuous proportion to that borne by the few brain motions of
which they are the _antitheta_, to the totality of motions throughout
Nature. Under this view the laws of the _universe_ are the laws of
_thought_. This is a very different thing, be it noted, from saying that
they are the laws of human thought. The laws of human thought bear to
them the same small proportion which the laws of the action of the wheels
of a watch upon one another bear to the entire science of dynamics. The
science of dynamics could never be evolved from a study of these laws.
But perhaps it may not be hopeless for man to attain some sound knowledge
of the laws of cosmic _thought_, inasmuch as we have some few instances
of the way _thought_ acts upon _thought_ open to our investigation in
our own minds, and since this is supplemented by our knowledge of the
physical laws of nature, which are a shadow, a probably complete shadow,
of all the laws of causation which operate throughout the _universe_,
throughout the all-embracing _Mind_ of the great _Autos_.
Such is Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s conception of the relation of Natural
Science to Ontology. I have presented it partly in his own words, partly
in mine. It has been my conscientious endeavor to put it in as strong and
favorable a light as possible, and not in any way to weaken the strength
of its logical consistency. The main thesis may now be briefly summarised
in the following propositions:
The phenomenal object is a syntheton or product of mental
synthesis.
Its efficient cause is a _real existence_ or _antitheton_.
Nature is the totality of phenomenal syntheta.
The _universe_ is the totality of autic _antitheta_.
There is no causation in Nature; but the Uniformities of Nature
are the shadows of the causal Laws of the Universe.
_Thought_ has no place in Nature: it is part of the autic
_universe_.
The syntheton of which _thought_ is the _antitheton_ is the
motion of brain molecules.
It is a probable hypothesis that the _antitheta_ of which the
motions of Diacrinomenal Nature are the syntheta, are _thought_.
This is the monistic hypothesis, that there is but one kind
of existing thing, viz. _thought_; in contradistinction to
the dualistic hypothesis that there are two kinds of existing
things, _thought_ and _motion_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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