The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
What shall we say then of _auta_ or _things in themselves_? Simply that
we do not know anything about them—that they are outside the pale of
human knowledge. If we even say they exist we are using the word “exist”
in an autic and unreal sense. It is phenomenal Nature which constitutes
the real Universe; of its autic _shadow_, supposing that there be such a
_shadow_, we know nothing. Need we then stay to criticise this unknown
_shadow_?
Even if we take Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s hypothesis as it stands we
find a marked distinction between the sense-compelling _auta_ and the
egoistic _auta_, or between the sense-compelling aspect of _auta_
and the egoistic or perceptive aspect. How is this distinction to be
explained and accounted for? I can see no answer to this question save
that the distinction is a matter of experience. Why not, then, trust
experience fully? Why go beyond it at all? Why not say that both the
sense-compelling aspect and the perceptive aspect are part of the
relation which is given in experience? If Dr. Stoney could only see his
way to this concession and could be led to adopt scientific monism, which
is based on relativity, he would still secure all that is valuable in
his hypothesis, and at the same time get rid of the difficulties which as
it stands encumber it. But it would no longer be a doctrine of _auta_.
For scientific monism is not a doctrine of _auta_ but a doctrine of
phenomena—phenomena regarded not only in their physical but also in their
psychological aspect. Unifying these two diverse aspects, it contends
that the conscious organism is one and indivisible; that it is a product
of evolution; that in its physical or material aspect this evolution has
given rise to the body and brain; that in its psychical or immaterial
aspect it has given rise to the mind and human consciousness; that these
two aspects, though distinguishable in analytic thought, are inseparable
in phenomenal existence; that just as the complex modes of energy of
the human brain have been evolved from the simpler modes of energy that
are found throughout organic and inorganic nature, so too the complex
modes of consciousness of the human mind have been evolved from the
simpler modes of infra-consciousness[19] that are associated with merely
organic and inorganic modes of energy. The last clause is admittedly
hypothetical. But it is submitted that the hypothesis is one that is
founded on strictly scientific and in no sense metaphysical or autic
analysis.
C. LLOYD MORGAN.
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See _Mental Evolution_ in _The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 2 (Jan. 1892),
p. 161.
EVOLUTIONARY LOVE.
AT FIRST BLUSH. COUNTER-GOSPELS.
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