The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But Whewell, whose masterly
comprehension of the history of science critics have been too ignorant
properly to appreciate, clearly shows that it is far from being the
overwhelmingly preponderant influence, even there.
Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined
line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to
steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel
first made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not
merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had
been ambitioning before, but to be the very main-spring of thinking,
and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history
of the development of thought, of all history, of all development.
This involves a positive, clearly demonstrable error. Let the logic in
question be of whatever kind it may, a logic of necessary inference or
a logic of probable inference, (the theory might perhaps be shaped to
fit either,) in any case it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself
to determine what conclusion follows from given premises; for unless it
will do so much, it will not suffice to explain why an individual train
of reasoning should take just the course it does take, to say nothing of
other kinds of development. It thus supposes that from given premises,
only one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope
at all for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion can
logically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from
logicians’ confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the
logic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold
good.
One remark occurs to me. If the evolution of history is in considerable
part of the nature of internal anancasm, it resembles the development of
individual men; and just as 33 years is a rough but natural unit of time
for individuals, being the average age at which man has issue, so there
should be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical
movement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another. Let us see if we
can make out anything of the kind. Take the governmental development of
Rome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates.
B. C. 753, Foundation of Rome.
B. C. 510, Expulsion of the Tarquins.
B. C. 27, Octavius assumes title Augustus.
A. D. 476, End of Western Empire.
A. D. 962, Holy Roman Empire.
A. D. 1453, Fall of Constantinople.
The last event was one of the most significant in history, especially
for Italy. The intervals are 243, 483, 502, 486, 491 years. All are
rather curiously near equal, except the first which is half the others.
Successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal. Let us
set down a few dates in the history of thought.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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