The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Suppose we have some sentient substance exposed to the impressions of the
surrounding world. The sense-impressions of the surrounding world leave
traces in the sentient substance; these traces, which are structures of
a certain form corresponding exactly to the various impressions, are
preserved and constitute a predisposition to being very easily revived
by impressions of the same kind. The revival of feeling in traces left
in the sentient structure from former impressions is called memory. If a
new impression of the same kind as the traces of the former impressions
affects a sentient being, the new impression already finds a convenient
path for its reception prepared. Its peculiar vibration fits in the old
trace and thus runs along very easily in the memory-grooves of former
impressions, reviving at the same time the feelings perceived at their
original formation. The feeling thus caused is composed of several
elements, which naturally melt into one: first, there is that kind of
feeling which is produced by the present impression; secondly, there is
the revival of former feelings or memory-sensations; and thirdly, there
is a feeling of congruence resulting from the combination of these two.
This third element is a new and a very important feature. We suppose that
it is extremely insignificant in the beginning, but being a constantly
growing factor, it rapidly increases in importance. The stronger and the
more independent the memory-structures become, the more clearly will
their congruence with fresh sense-impressions be felt as a congruence.
This feeling of congruence is the simplest form of what psychologists
generally call “recognition.”
The recognition of a sense-impression, as being the same as some former
sense-impression, adds to the feeling a new quality; it imparts meaning
to it. This feeling of a special kind will now stand for something. In
this way impressions upon sentient substance will, in the course of
their natural development, simply by the repetition of similar and same
impressions, come to indicate the presence of certain conditions that
cause the impression. This act of indicating something, of symbolising
the presence of a reality, of possessing meaning, is the birth of soul.
Sense-impressions that have acquired meaning are called sensations. A
sensation standing for a special object symbolises that object. Abstract
ideas are symbols of a higher degree, but they remain symbols just the
same. And it is the sentient symbols which constitute the soul.
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