The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
It is inconceivable how we can hope to explain a feeling by the laws of
motion; and so the fond hope of explaining the problems of the nature of
the soul by mechanics is preposterous. No objection can be made to the
possibility of explaining the delicate motions in the nervous substance
of the brain by the laws of molar or molecular mechanics. But these
explanations would throw no light upon the causation that takes place
in the mind. The properly psychical phenomena, the properly intelligent
action of thought, could not be explained in this way. For the world of
mentality introduces quite a new factor into the sphere of being.
What is this new factor?
The nature of mental activity consists in the symbolism of feelings.
Feelings, being different under different conditions and the same under
same conditions, become representative of their corresponding causes, and
thus the objects of experience are depicted in feeling symbols.
Representativeness, accordingly, is the nature of mind.
The question, How certain brain-structures operate, is a question of
the mechanics of nervous substance, and further, the question, How
thought-operations take place, is a question, so to say, of logical
mechanics. But the question, Why a certain idea responds to certain
stimuli and not to others, does not admit of a mechanical explanation or
formulation. The answer to this question will be a description of the
nature of the idea; and the nature of the idea is not a motion: it is the
meaning of which the idea is possessed.
The action of a mind depends upon the meaning of certain symbols. A
written or spoken word has a special meaning, and this meaning becomes
the determinant factor of mind action. The meaning of a word is not a
piece of matter, neither is it a motion. It is something _sui generis_.
I do not say that there is any inexplicable mystery connected with it.
On the contrary, wonderful as the fact is, it is not mysterious; it does
not stand in contradiction to any other fact of nature. Symbols stand for
something; they indicate, denote, or signify something. This significance
is called their meaning; and mind is a system of symbols in states of
awareness.
Now, neither states of awareness are mechanical, nor is the meaning of
words anything mechanical. How can we hope for a mechanical explanation
either of the soul or the mind or of any mental action?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account