to remember; for the mature mind is apt to forget or overlook the adaptations which the child-mind has made in its growth. If there were no such differences between the concept and the thing itself, actual physical contact would not be necessary. For one could rely wholly upon the sense-deliveries and each sense might operate entirely independently of all the others as there would be no necessity to correct the delivery of one by those of the others. This, of course, raises the question as to the necessity of sense-experience at all under conditions where there would be no disparity between the thing itself and the ideal representation of it in the mind. The absence of this variable quantity would open to the mind the possibility of really knowing the essential nature of objects in the phenomenal world, a condition of affairs which is admittedly now without the range of the powers of the mind. At any rate, the essential "thingness" of objects can never be comprehended by the mind until the diminution of this disparity between the object of sense and the mental picture of it which exists in the consciousness has proceeded to such a limit as either completely to have obliterated it or to such an extent that the psychic fluxion is so slight as not to matter. It is believed that the results of mental evolution, as the mind approaches the transfinite as a limit, will operate to minimize the fluxional quantity which subsists between all objects of sense and their ideal representation as data of consciousness. The conclusion that the mind of early men who lived hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of years ago on this planet consumed a much longer time in learning the adjustments between the objects which it contacted in the sensuous world and the elementary representations which were registered in its youthful consciousness than is to-day required for similar processes seems to be demanded, and substantiated as well, by what is known of the phyletic development of the mind in the human race.