The nature of man : $b Studies in optimistic philosophyMetchnikoff, Elie
Philosophy
The nature of man : $b Studies in optimistic philosophy
Metchnikoff, Elie
Human beings; Human biology; Life (Biology)
Schopenhauer himself recognises that this solution of the problem is not
satisfactory from the point of view of those who desire reassurance of
their immortality. “But,” he continues, “it is better than nothing, for
those who dread death from the point of view of absolute annihilation
should not despise the certainty of the persistence of the most vital
principle of life.”[223] He further remarks that it must be remembered
that nature is interested only in the preservation of the species, being
indifferent to the individual. We ourselves being only a part of nature
ought to further its plans. “If we wish to attain to a wider knowledge
of nature, we must place ourselves more in sympathy with it, and regard
life and death indifferently.”[224] Schopenhauer himself feels that his
theories and arguments are unsatisfactory. When he had reached the full
development of his doctrine, he admitted that it was negative in
character, and that it ended in negation. It spoke only of what it had
to deny and of what ought to be abandoned. It was obliged to regard as
nothingness all that could be acquired in the future. As a consolation,
he added that he meant relative nothingness, and not absolute
nothingness.
As an ultimate aim, there remained nothing but abrogation of the will to
live, and thus misery and wretchedness, which are the inseparable
accompaniments of human life, led to resignation.
As our life is no more than a succession of misfortunes, and as,
according to Schopenhauer, death is the plain conclusion of philosophy,
the end of the individual life must be pleasant. As a general rule, he
said, the death of a well-regulated life is calm and peaceful. But the
privilege of dying willingly, with joy and delight, is reserved for him
who has learned resignation, and has abolished and abandoned his will to
live. For such an one would be willing to die in reality, not merely in
appearance, and would neither desire nor claim a personal immortality.
He would give up readily the existence that we know. Whatever may
replace that existence is nothing from the point of view of
individuality. The Buddhistic faith called the position attained by him
who had given up the will to live, “Nirvâna, or nothingness.”[225]
The natural deduction from this pessimistic doctrine of Schopenhauer
would be to abolish the will to live by abolishing our individual life
by suicide. But such is not the advice of the philosopher. He is far,
however, from agreeing with those who regard suicide as criminal.[226]
He merely does not admit that it solves the question. “He who commits
suicide destroys the individual only, and not the species.” “Suicide is
the voluntary destruction of a solitary phenomenon, without in the
smallest degree affecting the system as a whole.”[227]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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