Ought we to extend our sympathy to all humanity, or to limit it to some particular section? Theorists have spoken of the solidarity of all humanity, believing it possible to extend our sympathy to the races furthest removed from us. In countries in which different races are brought in contact, very practical difficulties are encountered by the theorists. In America and in some other countries, for instance, laws have been passed against the Chinese, excluding the latter from the consideration granted to other races. The negro question also is very difficult in those countries in which the black race dwells amongst whites. In Europe it has been the custom to condemn the action of civilised races in taking their land from natives of primitive type. Sutherland, the author of a striking work on the origin and development of morality, justifies such arbitrary conduct. To the question, “Was it right for the whites to take possession of the Australian forests of the blacks?” he replied in the affirmative. “No doubt,” he said, “there is a moral instinct against it, but the action undoubtedly was right.”[130] In a summary of his conclusions he lays down that moral conduct is a compromise between the individual and social instincts that so often are opposed. But he has no more to say than his predecessors as to the rational basis of the compromise. The social instinct has been acquired by mankind too recently, and it is still too feeble, to be a trustworthy guide in all conduct. To obviate this difficulty, at many different times, divine sanction has been evoked to control the relations among men. The categorical law has been formulated with the same object. Thus by one means or another, some kind of social order has been kept up. The efficacy of these additional guides is seen clearly on those rare occasions when some special combination of circumstances has set people free from them. Thus at Moscow, in 1812, before the arrival of the French army restored authority, and lately, after the eruption in Martinique, the ordinary authority lapsed, the anti-social instincts of the people were loose, and a clear idea was given of the inherent weakness of the human social instinct. I have shown that in man the instinct for choosing food and the sexual and social instincts are still so weak that it is impossible to trust to them in the absence of other guidance. It is as equally necessary to determine what kind of food is most suitable for men in different conditions of life, and what means are best fitted to satisfy rationally his sexual and family instincts. So also it is urgent to determine exactly the direction and object of the social instinct. For the love of our fellow creatures we should seek the best ways of making them happy.