The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
Primary and Secondary Law. I have called the laws controlling
the behaviour of single individuals “primary laws”, implying that the
second law of thermodynamics, although a recognised law of Nature,
is in some sense a secondary law. This distinction can now be placed
on a regular footing. Some things never happen in the physical world
because they are impossible; others because they are too
improbable. The laws which forbid the first are the primary laws;
the laws which forbid the second are the secondary laws. It has been
the conviction of nearly all physicists[7] that at the root of
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everything there is a complete scheme of primary law governing the
career of every particle or constituent of the world with an iron
determinism. This primary scheme is all-sufficing, for, since it fixes
the history of every constituent of the world, it fixes the whole
world-history.
But for all its completeness primary law does not answer every question
about Nature which we might reasonably wish to put. Can a universe
evolve backwards, i.e. develop in the opposite way to our own system?
Primary law, being indifferent to a time-direction, replies, “Yes, it
is not impossible”. Secondary law replies, “No, it is too improbable”.
The answers are not really in conflict; but the first, though true,
rather misses the point. This is typical of some much more commonplace
queries. If I put this saucepan of water on this fire,
will the water boil? Primary law can answer definitely if it is given
the chance; but it must be understood that “this” translated into
mathematics means a specification of the positions, motions, etc.,
of some quadrillions of particles and elements of energy. So in
practice the question answered is not quite the one that is asked: If
I put a saucepan resembling this one in a few major respects
on a fire, will the water boil? Primary law replies, “It may
boil; it may freeze; it may do pretty well anything. The details given
are insufficient to exclude any result as impossible.” Secondary law
replies plainly, “It will boil because it is too improbable that it
should do anything else.” Secondary law is not in conflict with primary
law, nor can we regard it as essential to complete a scheme of law
already complete in itself. It results from a different (and rather
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more practical) conception of the aim of our traffic with the secrets
of Nature.
The question whether the second law of thermodynamics and other
statistical laws are mathematical deductions from the primary laws,
presenting their results in a conveniently usable form, is difficult
to answer; but I think it is generally considered that there is an
unbridgeable hiatus. At the bottom of all the questions settled by
secondary law there is an elusive conception of “a priori
probability of states of the world” which involves an essentially
different attitude to knowledge from that presupposed in the
construction of the scheme of primary law.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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