The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
You may be inclined to regard my insistence that entropy is something
excluded from the inventory of microscopic contents of the world as
word-splitting. If you have all the individuals before you, their
associations, arrangement and organisation are automatically before
you. If you have the stars, you have the constellations. Yes; but if
you have the stars, you do not take the constellations seriously.
It had become the regular outlook of science, closely associated
with its materialistic tendencies, that constellations are not to be
taken seriously, until the constellation of entropy made a solitary
exception. When we analyse the picture into a large number of particles
of paint, we lose the aesthetic significance of the picture. The
particles of paint go into the scientific inventory, and it is claimed
that everything that there really was in the picture is kept.
But this way of keeping a thing may be much the same as losing it.
The essence of a picture (as distinct from the paint) is arrangement.
Is arrangement kept or lost? The current answer seems inconsistent.
In so far as arrangement signifies a picture, it is lost; science has
to do with paint, not pictures. In so far as arrangement signifies
organisation it is kept; science has much to do with organisation.
Why should we (speaking now as philosophers, not scientists)
make a discrimination between these two aspects of arrangement?
The discrimination is made because the picture is no use to the
scientist—he cannot get further with it. As impartial judges it is our
duty to point out that likewise entropy is no use to the artist—he
cannot develop his outlook with it.
[Pg 107]
I am not trying to argue that there is in the external world an
objective entity which is the picture as distinct from the myriads of
particles into which science has analysed it. I doubt if the statement
has any meaning; nor, if it were true, would it particularly enhance
my esteem of the picture. What I would say is this: There is a side
of our personality which impels us to dwell on beauty and other
aesthetic significances in Nature, and in the work of man, so that our
environment means to us much that is not warranted by anything found
in the scientific inventory of its structure. An overwhelming feeling
tells us that this is right and indispensable to the purpose of our
existence. But is it rational? How can reason regard it otherwise than
as a perverse misrepresentation of what is after all only a collection
of atoms, aether-waves and the like, going about their business? If the
physicist as advocate for reason takes this line, just whisper to him
the word Entropy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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