The Navy as a Fighting MachineFiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
History
The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Fiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Navies; Sea-power; United States. Navy -- Management
For this reason, the idea so often suggested of keeping the fleet
normally broken up into smaller parts, those parts close enough
together to unite before an enemy could strike, is most objectionable.
It is impossible to keep the fleet together all the time, because of
needed repairs, needed relaxation, and the necessity for individual
drills that enable a captain or division commander to strengthen his
weak points; but nevertheless since the "mission" of training is
to attain fighting efficiency in the fleet as a whole, rather than
to attain fighting efficiency in the various parts; and since it
can be attained only by drilling the fleet as a whole, the decision
to keep the fleet united as much as practicable seems inevitably to
follow. Besides, the statement cannot be successfully controverted
that difficult things are usually not so well done as easy things,
that drills of large organizations are more difficult than drills
of small organizations, and that in every fleet the drills that
are done the worst are the drills of the fleet as a whole. How
could anything else be expected, when one considers how much more
often, for instance, a turret crew is exercised at loading than
the fleet is exercised at the difficult movement of changing the
"line of bearing"?
The older officers remember that for many years we carried on drills
at what we called "fleet tactics," though we knew they were only
tactical drills. They were excellent in the same sense as that in
which the drill of the manual of arms was excellent, or the squad
exercises given to recruits. They were necessary; but beyond the
elementary purpose of training in ship handling in fleet movements,
they had no "end in view"; they were planned with a limited horizon,
they were planned from the bottom.
_General Staff_.--In order to direct the drills of a fleet toward
some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order
that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. The end
does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a
difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating
or by groping in the dark. Strategy says that the best way in which
to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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