The Navy as a Fighting MachineFiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
History
The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Fiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Navies; Sea-power; United States. Navy -- Management
The temporary advanced base at the Elliot Islands was, as temporary
advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as
compared with the permanent bases at home. It fulfilled its mission,
however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required.
The strategic ability of the Japanese was indicated quite early
in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established
this base.
Of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words
usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance."
An instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary
is the island of Jamaica, and another is the island of Bermuda;
another is Malta, and still another is Gibraltar. These bases form
stepping-stones, by which Great Britain's navy may go by easy stages
from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or
going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that
the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress.
Viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the
strategic value of a certain position for a base is important,
no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and
the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations
make it good for offensive operations also. For instance, if we
wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point,
it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable
from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full
of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and
equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well
to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the
enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank,
and later against his rear and his communications. Naval bases
looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that European
nations place along their frontiers.
It is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of
all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several
directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more
difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a
longer line of communications that has to be protected. But this
weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant;
and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to
support them, because the longer are their lines of communications.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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