The Navy as a Fighting MachineFiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
History
The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Fiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Navies; Sea-power; United States. Navy -- Management
If the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened
to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts
faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture
near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in
daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then
report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what
craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were
in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. Such
information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief,
as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. If, for
instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming
at a speed of 10 knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding
behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around
them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight
until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy
ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely.
But suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting
of a line 10 miles long of, say, 50 destroyers, 50 miles ahead of
the main body; followed by a line of, say, 10 battle cruisers,
25 miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle
cruisers on each flank--say, 20 miles distant from the main body.
How could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size,
composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and
direction of advance? The purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our
ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen
will do its best to carry out that purpose. All the vessels of the
screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph
apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication
will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood
by our ships. Any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the
screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of
the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the
daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try
to hold us off. Now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval Powers
of Europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers
whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones
(the _Birmingham_, _Chester_, and _Salem_) the degree of success
that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be
estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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