The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievementsPaullin, Charles Oscar
History
The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievements
Paullin, Charles Oscar
United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Naval operations; United States. Navy -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
Early in 1781 Congress resolved to supersede the Board of Admiralty
with a Secretary of Marine, but failed to find a man who was willing
to accept the new office. In June, 1781, the plan of appointing
an Agent of Marine, and vesting in him the duties of the Board of
Admiralty, pending the selection of a Secretary of Marine, was
brought forward in Congress. The commissioners of admiralty were
able to forecast the results of this agitation for a new naval
system.[261] 2 On July 9, 1781, Ellery informed Congress “that his
family affairs pressed his return home, and therefore requested leave
of absence.”[262] As there was at this time but one Congressional
member serving on the Board, on the absence of Ellery no quorum could
be obtained. Lewis now prayed Congress to permit him to resign, or to
give him such further directions “as they in their wisdom shall deem
meet.”[263] On July 17 Congress accepted his resignation.[264] On
July 18 Congress put the marine prisoners in charge of the Commissary
of Prisoners of the army, and ordered the seal of the admiralty to be
deposited with the Secretary of Congress until a Secretary of Marine
should be appointed.[265] The Revolutionary Naval Department was
without a head.
The Board of Admiralty was not a satisfactory executive. It was at
all times dependent on its Congressional members for quorums. It
proved to be slower, more cumbersome, and less responsible than the
Marine Committee. The management of the navy still lacked unity and
concentration. On the other hand, had the Board not been superseded,
its commissioners would no doubt in time have developed greater
expertness and technical skill than did the members of the Marine
Committee. It should also be said that under more favorable auspices
the Board of Admiralty would have shown a higher administrative
efficiency than it did; for its lines had indeed fallen in unpleasant
places, and a bankrupt federal treasury and a decadent Congress
denied it the means requisite to the successful prosecution of its
work.
FOOTNOTES:
[217] Force’s Archives, 5th, III, 1336, Robert Morris to American
Commissioners at Paris, December 21, 1776. Morris wrote as follows:
“So long as that respectable body persist in the attempt to execute,
as well as to deliberate on their business, it never will be done as
it ought, and this has been urged many and many a time by myself and
others, but some of them do not like to part with power, or to pay
others for doing what they cannot do themselves.”
[218] Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 205,
Papers of William Vernon and Navy Board.
[219] Ibid., 257, Ellery to Vernon, March 23, 1779.
[220] Force’s Archives, 5th, II, 1106, Jones to Morris, October 16,
1776.
[221] Journals of Continental Congress, October 29, 1778.
[222] Ibid., July 30, 1779.
[223] Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, I,
207-08, Washington to Jay, April, 1779.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account