The reason why Congress appointed an Agent of Marine instead of a Secretary of Marine is not at all points clear. Having failed to secure the acceptance of McDougall as Secretary of Marine, Congress may have decided that the small and disheartening business of the navy would not attract first-rate talent; or that for the transaction of this business a full-fledged executive department was not necessary. It is more probable that the appointment of an Agent of Marine, under the circumstances of a disagreeing Congress, the failure of the Board of Admiralty, and the improbability of securing an efficient Secretary, was merely a temporary and feasible expedient for conducting the affairs of the navy. There are obvious reasons why the proposal to give the Superintendant of Finance the power to appoint the Agent of Marine, or the selection of Morris as Agent, should have aroused vigorous opposition. Men of Samuel Adams’s way of thinking would oppose it, among other reasons, because it placed too much power in the hands of one man. The friends of the navy would dislike to see the Naval Department swallowed up by the Department of Finance. But on the other hand, many considerations recommended the step which was finally taken. It was the most economical disposition of the naval business which could be made. Morris had superior qualifications for the office, and he was at once available. Indeed, he was the only man in sight that promised to be equal to the task of straightening out the tangle of marine accounts, of financing a bankrupt navy, and of wielding effectively that arm of the military service. He was admirably qualified for the headship of the Naval Department by his experience as a man of business, familiar with accounts and the selection of employees, as the owner of a fleet of merchantmen, and as one of two or three of the most influential members of the Marine Committee during the years 1776 and 1777, when the navy was founded. Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the navy while Morris was directing it, they did not spring from the lack of an efficient executive. For the first time during the Revolution its management was marked by despatch, decision, and an expert and adequate understanding of its problems.