Before the unjust, unwarrantable, unconstitutional, and impertinent interference of enthusiasts and intermeddlers in other states with this domestic relation, rendered it necessary for the State to guard against the effect of their incendiary publications, and to tighten the bonds of slavery by defensive legislation, against persistent and untiring efforts to produce insurrection, the uniform course of decision in the State was shaped with a view to ameliorate the condition of the slave, and to protect him against the tyranny and cruelty of the master and other persons.[16] The act of 1831 did not accomplish its intended purpose. It was passed largely in the interest of colonization. It also failed to consider those slaves who had made contracts for their freedom prior to its passage, but who had not obtained the consent of the state, and those who had been freed by will, but whose masters were not yet deceased. The disabilities were removed from these two classes of slaves by the act of 1833, which excepted them from the operation of the act of 1831.[17] This policy was further modified in 1842, when the state again placed the problem of emancipation entirely in the hands of the county courts.[18] Judge McKinney held that this act empowered the county court “to adjudge whether or not it would be consistent with the interest and policy of the state to permit any manumitted slave or free persons of color to reside in this state,” and that their decisions were “not subject to the supervision and control of the superior judicial tribunals.”[19] He maintained that the courts were acting as administrative agents of the state and that the matter was wholly political and not judicial.[20] This meant that the policy of exclusion was considerably modified. Any slave on manumission had the privilege of petitioning the county court to be permitted to remain in the state. The conditions that had to be met by the slaves were: “First, proof of good character; second, that it would violate the feelings of humanity to remove the applicant; third, a bond with satisfactory security for good behavior.”[21] This liberal change in the policy adopted in 1831 was soon eliminated. In 1849, the state reverted to the policy of exclusion. The discretionary power granted to the county courts in 1842 was taken away and emancipation was prohibited “except upon the terms and conditions imposed by the act of 1831, Ch. 102.”[22] Judge Caruthers, explaining this shifting policy of the legislature, said: It is a vexed and perplexing question, upon which public opinion, acting upon the representatives of the people, has been subject to much vibration between sympathy and humanity for the slave and the safety and well-being of society. Hence, the frequent changes in our legislation on the subject.[23]