Yet, those of our rulers who wanted a real peace treaty not a mere truce for dividing the spoils, ought to have known, what the Americans did not, that no peace could be got through a diplomatic conference at Paris. They should, in the first place, have secured a real representation of the popular forces of the British Empire, and in the second place, a forum where those forces could take effect. Public opinion had already provided the foundation of such a forum in the demand for a League of Nations. The proper procedure, obviously, was to stop hostilities, subject to guarantees, and to set up a League of Nations that should make peace. It would have taken little longer to get together than did the diplomatic delegations, and would certainly have taken no longer in reaching a result. Both its constitution and its conclusions would probably have been resisted to the verge of rupture by the French and Italian Governments; but would, with the moral sanction of the League and with the urgent pressure of the military situation, have been easily enforced by the British and Americans. MM. Clemenceau and Tardieu could override Messrs. Lloyd George and Philip Kerr easily enough, for, after all, the former do stand for forces, the latter are merely phenomena. They could even override Messrs. Wilson and Lansing, for though these did represent real forces, they could not reproduce them in Paris. But mixed French and Italian delegations of all parties would have offered points of contact to British and American Liberals and even to German and Russian Socialists. The cleavages between the various national interests would have been bridged and an internationalist cement introduced to counteract the imperialist cleavages. Of course, such a body would not have elaborated the details of peace in a plenary debate. It would have proceeded as national Constituent Assemblies always have done after civil war. It would have debated and approved general principles for its own permanent constitution and the resettlement of Europe, and referred them for elaboration to committees controlling the diplomatic experts.