The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments
History
The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments
Home rule -- Ireland; Ireland -- Politics and government
As a matter of fact the form of government of these various Dominions and
their relations to the Mother Country are largely a geographical accident.
It is impossible to conceive a system of “Home Rule all round” in which
England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland would have the same positions and
powers as Canada, Australia and South Africa, and would maintain the same
relations towards each other as all three Dominions now occupy towards the
United Kingdom. Nor could such an idea be entertained by any one framing a
constitution, intended to be the commencement of the federalisation, first
of the United Kingdom and afterwards in due time of the British Empire,
when circumstances and the growth of public opinion render it possible to
secure the representation of the Dominions in an expanded Imperial
Parliament.
In a truly federal system such as those of Canada and Australia, the
citizens who elect representatives direct to the Federal Parliament to
deal with the broader issues and interests of the Commonwealth, are
naturally fully represented. If the Irish Legislature is to be precluded
from dealing with Imperial matters, it is obviously only just that the
Irish people, as citizens of the Empire, should send a proportionate
number of representatives to the Imperial Parliament to express their
views on Imperial subjects, and, under a perfect federal system, the
expression of their views would be confined to Imperial subjects. This
would consequently necessitate the continued presence of a certain number
of Irish members at Westminster. In view of the fact that the “in and out”
system, which caused so much criticism of Mr. Gladstone’s Bill, has been
in force for over forty years in the Hungarian Parliament at Budapest, in
which the Croatian representatives are only entitled to vote on matters
affecting the whole Kingdom, while precluded from voting on those
affecting Hungary alone, it is evident that the practical inconvenience
cannot be anything like so great as has been imagined. But whatever
inconvenience might result to the Government from the presence of Irish
representatives in such circumstances, it certainly cannot be allowed to
outweigh the injustice of leaving such a large section of the British
electorate, as is the Irish people, unrepresented in a chamber which deals
with matters that may very seriously affect their interests. Mr. Asquith’s
hint at the possibility of such a change in the Standing Orders of the
House of Commons as will distribute legislative business between English
and Scotch Standing Committees, suggests a method of combining the
retention of the Irish members at Westminster, with their exclusion from
participation in other than Imperial matters.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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