Many of Duguit’s errors come from a misconception of the social process. Violently opposed to a collective will, he sees in the individual thought and will the only genuine “_chose en soi_” (it is interesting to notice that _la chose en soi_ finds a place in the thought of many pluralists). Not admitting the process of “community” he asserts that _la règle de droit_ is anterior and superior to the state; he does not see the true relation of _le droit_ to _l’état_, that they evolve together, that the same process which creates _le droit_ creates _l’état_.[109] The will of the people, he insists, can not create _le droit_. Here he does not see the unity of the social process. He separates will and purpose and the activity of the reciprocal interchange instead of seeing them as one. Certainly the will of the people does not create _le droit_, but the social process in its entire unity does. “Positive law must constantly follow _le droit objectif_.” Of course. “_Le droit objectif_ is constantly evolving.” Certainly. But how evolving? Here is where we disagree. The social process creates _le droit objectif_, and will is an essential part of the social process. Purpose is an essential part of the social process. Separate the parts of the social process and you have a different idea of jurisprudence, of democracy, of political institutions. Aim is all-important for Duguit. The rule of _le droit_ is the rule of conscious ends: only the aim gives a will its worth; if the aim is juridical (conformed to _la règle de droit_), then the will is juridical. Thus Duguit’s pragmatism is one which has not yet rid itself of absolute standards. It might be urged that it has, because he finds his absolute standards in “social solidarity.” But any one who believes that the individual will is a _chose en soi_, and who separates the elements of the social process, does not wholly admit the self-sufficing character of that process. The modern tendency in many quarters, however, in regard to conceptions of social practice, is to substitute ends for will.[110] This is a perfectly comprehensible reaction, but future jurisprudence must certainly unite these two ideas. Professor Jethro Brown says, “The justification for governmental action is found not in consent but in the purpose it serves.” Not in that alone. De Maeztu says, “The profound secret of associations is not that men have need of one another, but that they need the same thing.” These two ideas can merge. Professor Brown makes the common good the basis of the new doctrine of natural right.[111] But we must all remember, what I do not doubt this writer does remember, that purpose can never be a _chose en soi_, and that, of the utmost importance, the “new natural law” can be brought into manifestation only by certain modes of association.