Sovereignty, it is true, is a fact, not a theory. Whoever can gain obedience has the sovereign power. But we must go beyond this and seek those political methods by which the command shall be with those who have evolved a genuine authority, that is, an authority evolved by what I have called the true social process. We must go beyond this and seek those methods by which a genuine authority _can_ be evolved, by which the true social process shall be everywhere possible. To repeat: first, the true social process must be given full opportunity and scope, then it must be made the basis of political method. Then shall we see emerging a genuine authority which we can all acclaim as sovereign. There is, I agree with the pluralists, a great advantage in that authority being multiple and varied, but a static pluralism, so to speak, would be as bad as a static monism. The groups are always reaching out _towards_ unity. Our safeguard against crystallization is that every fresh unity means (as I have tried to show in chapter III) the throwing out of myriad fresh differences—our safeguard is that the universe knows no static unity. Unification means sterilization; unifying means a perpetual generating. We do not want the unified sovereignty of Germany; but when you put the individual and the group first, you get unify_ing_ sovereignty.[119] ----- Footnote 105: See writings of Ramiro de Maeztu in New Age and his book mentioned above. Footnote 106: See “Traité de Droit Constitutionnel” and “Études de Droit Public”: I, L’État, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive; II, L’État, Les Gouvernants and Les Agents. As in French _droit_ may be either law or _a_ right, Duguit, in order to distinguish between these meanings, follows the German distinction of _objektives Recht_ and _subjektives Recht_, and speaks of _le droit objectif_ and _le droit subjectif_, thus meaning by _le droit objectif_ merely law. But because he at the same time writes of power as resting on function in contradistinction to the classical theory of the abstract “rights” of man, rights apart from law and only declared by law, political writers sometimes speak of Duguit’s “objective” theory of law, as opposed to a “subjective” theory of law, when jurists would tell us that law _is_ objective, and that subjective right is always merely _a_ right, my right. This matter of terminology must be made much clearer than it is at present. Footnote 107: Although how far Duguit had in mind merely the solidarity of French and Roman law has been questioned. Footnote 108: I have just read in a work on sociology, “Men surrender their individual wills to the collective will.” No, the true social process is not when they _surrender_ but when they _contribute_ their wills to the collective will. See chs. II-VI, “The Group Process.” Footnote 109: See p. 130. Footnote 110: