To sum up: Law should not be a “body” of knowledge; it should be revitalized anew at every moment. Our judges cannot administer law by knowing law alone. They have to be so closely in touch with a living, growing society, so at one with the conceptions that are being evolved by that society that their interpretations will be the method by which our so-called “body of law” shall indeed be alive and grow in correspondence with the growth of society. This is what gives to our American supreme courts their large powers, and makes us choose for judges not only men who understand law and who can be trusted for accurate interpretation, but men who have a large comprehension of our country’s needs, wide conceptions of social justice, and who have creative minds—who can make legal interpretation contribute to the structure of our government.[62] The modern lawyer must see, amidst all the complexity of the twentieth-century world, where we are tending, what our true purpose is, and the part law can take in making manifest that purpose. The modern lawyer must create a new system of service. A living law we demand to-day—this is always the law of the given condition, never a “rule.” ----- Footnote 48: Col. Law Rev. 8, 610. Footnote 49: Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 20. The influence of sociology on law has here been very marked. For further discussion of a teleological jurisprudence, see ch. XXIX. Footnote 50: Duguit, L’État, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive, 398–409, from Jellinek, System der subjektiren öffentlichen Rechte, 193. Footnote 51: The whole legal history of associations and the development of association law throws much light on the growth of the community idea. Footnote 52: Also, I recognize, because his “_droit objectif_” based on social solidarity tends to sweep away contract. It is interesting to notice that contract is being attacked from more than one point of view. The bearing of all this on politics will be seen later, especially in ch. XXIX, “Political Pluralism and Sovereignty.” Footnote 53: Quoted by Roscoe Pound in Col. Law Rev. 8, 616. Footnote 54: Statutes limiting the hours of labor were held unconstitutional, railway corporations were held not to be required to furnish discharged employees with a cause for dismissal, etc. Footnote 55: Harlan, J., in Mugler _v._ Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. Taken from Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, Yale Law Journal, 18, 468. Footnote 56: The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, Harv. Law Rev. 27, 195–234. Footnote 57: “Statutes ... have taken many features of the subject out of the domain of agreement and the tendency of judicial decision has been in effect to attach rights and liabilities to the relation of insurer and insured and thus to remove insurance from the category of contract.” Footnote 58: