Our concentration had to be flexible enough to enable us to bring our chief effort to bear upon the spot where the enemy would prove most active. The violation of Belgium made us acquainted with the intentions of the German staff--the great conflict would take place in the north. As we were obliged, before engaging in it, to wait for the coming into line of the English army, which was to take place only on Aug. 20, we at once took measures to retain the greatest possible number of German troops in Alsace and in Lorraine. In Alsace, our first attack, which was badly conducted, took us to Muelhausen, but we could not hold the city (Aug. 7.) A second attack, led by General Pau, brought us back there. On Aug. 20 we held the road to Colmar through the Vosges and the plain. The enemy had sustained great losses. But from that time the unfortunate events in Lorraine and Belgium forced us to limit the field of operations in Alsace as well as the intensity of our efforts (Aug. 20.) In Lorraine our offensive had first been brilliantly successful. On Aug. 19 we had reached Sarrebourg, Les Etangs, Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Chateau-Salins. But on the 20th the enemy, strongly intrenched on thoroughly fortified territory, resumed the offensive. On the 22d, 23d, and 24th we were compelled to fall back on Grand-Courenne de Nancy and south of Luneville. On the 25th simultaneous counterattacks from the armies of Gens. Dubail and Castelnau greatly strengthened our positions. But seven or eight German army corps and four divisions of cavalry had overcome the magnificent resistance of Liege. Every one knows of the conditions under which the French took the offensive in Belgium with the armies of Gens. Ruffey and Langle de Cary. As soon as the English Army was ready in the region of Mons we took the offensive in Belgian Luxemburg with the armies of Gens. Ruffey and Langle de Cary. This offensive was at once checked, with great losses on our side. Here again the ground had been strongly fortified by the enemy. There was also, in some of our army corps, a failure to transmit and carry out orders (Aug. 21-23.) On the left of these two armies and in conjunction with the English army Gen. Lanrezac's army, anxious for its right wing, then fell back (Aug. 24) on the line that stretches between Beaumont and Givet. On the 25th and 26th the English army, kept in check at Landrecies and Le Cateau, withdrew toward the Marne. These days were marked by bloody contests. The enemy lost heavily, but constantly gained ground. At that time we either had to hold the ground under the perilous conditions resulting from the retreat of our left wing or else retreat along the whole front until it were possible to resume the offensive under favorable conditions. The Commander in Chief decided upon the latter alternative.