The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had no regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130, Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence." We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves. Summary of the Secret Documents I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series of conversations which he had had with the Military Attache of the British Legation, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain, and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the British Military Attache insisted on discussing the question of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the meantime, of a Belgian spy system in Germany. II. When in the year 1912 Lieut. Col. Barnardiston had been succeeded by Lieut. Col. Bridges as British Military Attache in Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, had been succeeded by Gen. Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective Governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both Governments.