It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liege prevented the English from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a compliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the American people. The fact is that Liege was taken a long time before the British troops landed at Calais, and it is still today in the hands of the Germans without in the least interfering with the arrival of British reinforcements in France and in the territory still left in the possession of Belgium. The fact is that Liege was not taken to prevent the British from entering Belgium, but because it was part of the plan of the German General Staff to invade Belgium at once, to march across her territory, to crush the army of France as soon as possible, and then to turn and attack the Russians on the east. It is interesting to recall here the famous conversation held between the British Ambassador in Berlin, on one side, and the Chancellor of the Empire, Mr. Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. von Jagow, on the other side, at the time of the invasion of Belgium by the German troops. These conversations prove, indisputably, the premeditated intention of Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality: To the request of Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador in Berlin, to be allowed to know if Germany would pledge herself to respect the neutrality of Belgium, the German Secretary of State replied that "this neutrality had already been violated by Germany." Herr von Jagow went again into the "reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death to them, for, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would mean time gained by the Russians for the bringing up of their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was the inexhaustible supply of troops." (Official report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to the British Government.)