The Non-religion of the Future: A Sociological StudyGuyau, Jean-Marie
Religion
The Non-religion of the Future: A Sociological Study
Guyau, Jean-Marie
Irreligion and sociology; Religion; Social sciences
Well, and why stop at God? Liberty of thought, which has been
incessantly turning and adapting dogma to its progress, has it in its
power to make a step beyond. Immutable faith is hemmed in by a circle
which is daily shrinking. For the liberal Protestant this contraction
has reached its extreme, and centre and circumference are one and the
process is continuing. Why should not God Himself be a symbol? What is
this mysterious Being, after all, but a popular personification of the
_divine_ or even of ideal humanity; in a word, of morality?
[Sidenote: The result practically a religion of morals. Perceived to be
so in Germany.]
Thus a purely moral symbolism comes in process of time to be
substituted for a metaphysical symbolism. We are close upon the Kantian
conception of a religion of duty, resting upon a simple postulate or
even a simple generalization of human conduct, to the effect that
morality and happiness are in the last resort in harmony. A faith in
morals, thus understood, has been adopted by many Germans as the basis
of religious faith. Hegelians have converted religion into a moral
symbolism. Strauss defines morality as the “harmonization” of man with
his species, and defines religion as the harmonization of man with the
universe; and these definitions, which seem at first sight to imply
a difference in extent and a certain opposition between morality and
religion, aim in reality at showing their ultimate unity; the ideal of
the species and the purpose of the universe are one, and if by chance
they should be distinct, it would be the more universal ideal that
morality itself would command us to follow. Von Hartmann, also, in
spite of his mystical tendencies, concludes that there is no religion
possible except one which will consecrate the moral autonomy of the
individual, his salvation by his own effort and not by that of somebody
else (autosoterism as distinguished from heterosoterism). From which
it follows that, in Von Hartmann’s opinion, the essence of religious
adoration and gratitude should be one’s respect for the essential and
impersonal element in one’s self; in other words, piety is, properly
speaking, no more than a form of morality and of absolute renouncement.
[Sidenote: Also in France.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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