As it has been shown that all duty, and that alone, ought to be vowed to God in covenant, it is manifest that what is lawfully engaged to in swearing by the name of God is enjoined in the moral law, and, because of the authority of that law, ought to be performed as a duty. But it is now to be proved that what is promised to God by vow or oath, ought to be performed also because of the act of Covenanting. The performance of that exercise is commanded, and the same law which enjoins that the duties thereby engaged to be discharged, finds the Covenanter, or the Covenanting community, bound by the deed itself to fulfil them; and thus, by the service, the party under original obligation to obey, is brought under one that is superadded. The Covenanting party, not as independent, but as under the authority of God, by means of the exercise binds itself to duty. He commands to vow, that men may be brought under additional obligation; and when they obey, he recognises them as voluntarily engaged, and, according to his will, additionally called to fulfil. "The obligation arises entirely from the act of the creatures, using a divine ordinance, by vowing unto God, and covenanting with him, whereby they bind their souls with a bond to serve the Lord."[314] It is wrong to imagine that the obligation comes solely from the will of those who vow. Were not the exercise of vowing commanded, nor the law of God to hold those who engage in it bound by their own act, these should not be under obligation. By vowing, they bind themselves, not as by themselves, but by the authority of God. Or, by vowing, they submit to a requirement of his law, in yielding obedience to which they become bound, not by themselves but by his authority, to perform the duties vowed. SECTION I. Personal and Social Covenanting both entail obligation on the Covenanting parties.