Every species of co-operation with the appointed functionaries of an immoral and unscriptural civil government, may not imply the recognition of that power to be the ordinance of God. To co-operate with these for example, in the execution of justice, is not necessarily to acknowledge that the power is of God. If the forms of procedure be in themselves proper, and the laws just, the carrying of them into effect for the good of society and for the glory of God, is in itself right. But it is one thing to say that justice should be done in society, and also to aid in the execution of it, and it may be quite another to acknowledge that the civil rulers of the given society have a right to do so in virtue of authority from God. Justice should be done, by a civil power--agreeable to God's preceptive will. If no such power exist, the community are to blame for not originating such a power. And if justice be not done, they are also culpable;--because of the want of such a power justice is not to be undone. Were such to be allowed, the community would be chargeable with the crimes of both remaining without a proper civil power and permitting evil to be committed with impunity. To co-operate with an unlawful civil power in doing justice, is therefore to do less evil, yea more good, than would be done by refraining from co-operation. The swearing of an oath by those called to testify to truth, or to act in the weighing of evidence, as on a jury, in order to the execution of justice, does not necessarily imply a recognition of the authority that calls to do so, to be of God. It is the using of a lawful means of giving assurance regarding truth necessary to be ascertained, but does not essentially imply that the claims of those exercising power to the use of that power, are good. A lawful constituted authority, whether civil or ecclesiastical, has a right to claim an oath for proper purposes. But an oath may be sworn to others besides. It may be sworn for a good end, even to those whose pretensions to power and authority may not be well founded, but not as if they had a right to claim it, but merely because of the giving of it being in itself right. The oath may be sworn for a proper purpose before an individual who has correct impressions of its sacredness, even though he may be acting for an unwarranted civil authority. It is not easy to conceive, however, how one could swear an oath to an infidel, or to any other who regards not the oath as a solemn religious engagement. The giving of an oath before a judge and jury, or on a jury before a judge, under an unscriptural government, does not include the recognition of those as using a power deputed by God; but contemplates them as Christian men, though mistaken as to their power, yet doing what is in itself right, and which, if done by those possessed of authority from God, would be done in all things, though imperfectly, according to his will. To swear to do justice, is