The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
Sympathy, in the ordinary use of the word, requires the co-operation
of the altruistic sentiment or affection--a disposition of mind which
is particularly apt to display itself as kindly emotion towards other
beings. This sentiment,[4] only, induces us to take a kindly interest
in the feelings of our neighbours. It involves a tendency, or
willingness, and, when strongly developed, gives rise to an eager
desire, to sympathise with their pains and pleasures. Under its
influence, our sympathetic feeling is no longer a mere matter of
association; we take an active part in its production, we direct our
attention to any circumstance which we believe may affect the feelings
of the person whom we love, to any external manifestation of his
emotions. We are anxious to find out his joys and sorrows, so as to be
able to rejoice with him and to suffer with him, and, especially, when
he stands in need of it, to console or to help him. For the altruistic
sentiment is not merely willingness to sympathise; it is above all a
conative {111} disposition to do good. The latter aptitude must be
regarded rather as the cause than as the result of the former;
affection is not, as Adam Smith maintained,[5] merely habitual
sympathy, or its necessary consequence. It is true that sympathetic
pain, unaided by kindliness, may induce a person to relieve the
suffering of his neighbour, instead of shutting his eyes to it; but
then he does so, not out of regard to the feelings of the sufferer,
but simply to free himself of a painful cognition. Nor must it be
supposed that the altruistic sentiment prompts to assistance only by
strengthening the sympathetic feeling. The sight of the wounded
traveller may have caused no less pain to the Pharisee than to the
good Samaritan; yet it would have been impossible for the Samaritan to
dismiss his pain by going away, since he felt a desire to assist the
wounded, and his desire would have been left ungratified if he had not
stopped by the wayside. To the egoist, the relief offered to the
sufferer is a means of suppressing the sympathetic pain; to the
altruist, the sympathetic pain is, so to say, a means of giving
relief. The altruist wants to know, to feel the pain of his neighbour,
because he desires to help him. Why are the most kind-hearted people
often the most cheerful, if not because they think of alleviating the
misery of their fellow-creatures, instead of indulging in the
sympathetic pain which it evokes?
[Footnote 4: I use the word "sentiment" in the sense proposed by Mr.
Shand, in his article, 'Character and the Emotions,' in _Mind_, N.S.
v. 203 _sqq._, and adopted by Professor Stout, _op. cit._ p. 221
_sqq._ Sentiments cannot be actually felt at any one moment; "they are
complex mental dispositions, and may, as divers occasions arise, give
birth to the whole gamut of the emotions" (_ibid._ p. 223 _sq._).]
[Footnote 5: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ p. 323.]
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