[Footnote 20: _Cf._ Austin, _Lectures on Jurisprudence_, i. 104; Tönnies, 'Philosophical Terminology,' in _Mind_, N.S., viii. 304. Von Jhering (_Zweck im Recht_, ii. 23) defines the German _Sitte_ as "die im Leben des Volks sich bildende verpflichtende Gewohnheit"; and a similar view is expressed by Wundt (_Ethik_, p. 128 _sq._).] [Footnote 21: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 22 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 48).] [Footnote 22: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 256 _sq._] [Footnote 23: Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_, p. 60.] [Footnote 24: Rink, _Greenland_, p. 201 _sq._] [Footnote 25: Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, p. 44.] [Footnote 26: Junod, _Ba-Ronga_, p. 477.] [Footnote 27: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 224.] [Footnote 28: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 18.] [Footnote 29: For the history of these words, see Wundt, _op. cit._ p. 19 _sqq._ For other instances illustrating the moral character of custom, see Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Law and Customs_, p. 34 (Amaxosa); Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 94 (Kandhs); Kubary, _Ethnographische Beiträge zur Kenntniss der Karolinischen Inselgruppe_, i. 73 (Pelew Islanders); Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 119.] [Footnote 30: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 69.] Disobedience to custom evokes public indignation. In {120} the lower stages of civilisation, especially, custom is a tyrant who binds man in iron fetters, and who threatens the transgressor, not only with general disgrace, but often with bodily suffering. "To believe that man in a savage state is endowed with freedom either of thought or action," says Sir G. Grey, "is erroneous in the highest degree";[31] and this statement is corroborated by an array of facts from all quarters of the savage world.[32] Now, as the rule of custom is a moral rule, the indignation aroused by its transgression is naturally a moral emotion. Moreover, where all the duties incumbent on a man are expressed in the customs of the society to which he belongs, it is obvious that the characteristics of moral indignation are to be sought for in its connection with custom. The most salient feature of custom is its generality. Its transgression calls forth public indignation; hence the flavour of generality which characterises moral disapproval. Custom is fixed once for all, and takes no notice of the preferences of individuals. By recognising the validity of a custom, I implicitly admit that the custom is equally binding for me and for you and for all the other members of the society. This involves disinterestedness; I admit that a breach of the custom is equally wrong whether I myself am immediately concerned in the act or not. It also involves apparent impartiality; I assume that my condemnation of the act is independent of the relationship in which the parties concerned in it stand to me personally, or, at least, I am not aware that my condemnation is influenced by any {121} such relationship. And this holds good