Discarding all questions of etymology as irrelevant to our subject,[8] we shall, in our analysis of moral concepts, {134} endeavour to fix the true import of each concept by examining how, and under what circumstances, the term expressing it is generally applied. We shall restrict ourselves to the principal, typical terms which are used as predicates in moral judgments. If we succeed in proving that they are all fundamentally derived from either moral indignation or moral approval, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the origin of the rest. [Footnote 8: The attempt to apply the philological method to an examination of moral concepts has, in my opinion, proved a failure--which may be seen from Mr. Baynes' book on _The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the Light of Language_.] The tendency in a phenomenon to arouse moral indignation is directly expressed by the term _bad_, and a disposition of mind which is characterised by some special kind of badness is called _vice_. Closely allied to the term "bad" is the term _wrong_. But there is a difference in the use of these words. Whilst "bad" may be applied both to a person's character and to his conduct, only his conduct may be said to be "wrong." The reason for this is that the concept of moral wrongness is modelled on the idea of a moral law, the breach of which is regarded as "wrong." And, by laying down a moral law, we only enjoin a certain mode of conduct; we do not command a person to have a certain character. The moral law is expressed by the term _ought_, a term which, in modern ethics, generally occupies a central position among moral predicates. The notion which it embodies is frequently looked upon as ultimate and incapable of analysis--"too elementary" (to quote Professor Sidgwick) "to admit of any formal definition."[9] This view, I think, instead of simplifying the matter, has been one of the chief causes of the prevailing confusion in ethical thought. [Footnote 9: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 33.] Far from being a simple notion, "ought" appears to me clearly decomposable, even though it have a special flavour of its own. First of all, it expresses a conation. When I feel that I ought to do a thing, I experience an impulse to do it, even though some opposite impulse may finally determine my action. And when I say to another man, "You ought to do this, or that," there is certainly implied {135} a purpose to influence his action in a certain direction. In the notion of _duty_, the ethical import of which is identical with that of "ought," this conative element is not so obvious.