of mankind," but a significant indication of the true import of the notion of duty itself. [Footnote 10: _Romans_, iv. 15.] [Footnote 11: Diogenes Laërtius, _Solon_, 10. Cicero, _Pro S. Roscio Amerino_, 25.] [Footnote 12: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 72.] [Footnote 13: Bentham, _Deontoiogy_, i. 10.] [Footnote 14: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, pp. 22, 75 _sq._] [Footnote 15: Murray, _Introduction to Ethics_, p. 108.] It is not, then, in the emotion of approval that we must seek for the origin of this concept. We may undoubtedly applaud him who is faithful to his duty, but the idea of duty involves no applause. There is no contradiction in the omission of an act being disapproved of and the performance of it being praised. "Ought" and "duty" express only the tendency of an omission to call forth disapproval, and say nothing about the consequences of the act's performance. The conscientious man refuses the homage paid to him, by saying, "I have only done my duty." Duty is a "stern {137} lawgiver," who threatens with punishment, but promises no reward.[16] [Footnote 16: The intrinsic connection between duty and disapproval has previously been noticed by Stuart Mill (in a note to James Mill's _Analysis of the Human Mind_, ii. 325), according to whom "no case can be pointed out in which we consider anything as a duty, and any act or omission as immoral or wrong, without regarding the person who commits the wrong and violates the duty as a fit object of punishment." _Cf._ also Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, ch. 15, and Gizycki, _Introduction to the Study of Ethics_, English adaptation by Stanton Coit, p. 102 _sq._] The ideas of "ought" and "duty" thus spring from the same source as the ideas of "bad" and "wrong." To say that a man ought to do a thing is, so far as the morality of his action is concerned, the very same thing as to say that it is bad, or wrong, of him not to do it--in other words, that the not-doing of it has a tendency to call forth moral disapproval.