The emphasis which "injustice" lays on the partiality of a certain mode of conduct always involves a condemnation of that partiality. Like every other kind of wrongness, "injustice" is thus a concept which is obviously based on the emotion of moral disapproval. And so is the concept of "justice," whether it involves the notion that an injustice would be committed if a certain duty were not fulfilled, or it is simply used to denote that a certain mode of conduct is "not unjust." But there is yet another sense in which the word "just" is applied. It may emphasise the impartiality of an act in a tone of praise. Considering how difficult it is to be perfectly impartial and to give every man his due, especially when one's own interests are {145} concerned, it is only natural that men should be applauded for being just, and consequently that to call a person just should often be to praise him. So, also, "justice" is used as the name for a virtue, "the mistress and queen of all virtues."[22] But all this does not imply that an emotion of moral approval enters into the concept of justice. It only means that one word is used to express a certain concept--a concept which, as we have seen, ultimately derives its import from moral disapproval--_plus_ an emotion of approval. That the concept of justice by itself involves no reference to the emotion of moral approval appears from the fact that it is no praise to say of an act that it is "only just." [Footnote 22: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 6.] * * * * * From the concepts springing from moral disapproval we pass to those springing from moral approval. Foremost among these ranks the concept _good_.[23] [Footnote 23: Professor Bain, who takes a very legal view of the moral consciousness, maintains (_Emotions and the Will_, p. 292) that "positive good deeds and self-sacrifice . . . transcend the region of morality proper, and occupy a sphere of their own." A similar opinion has been expressed by Prof. Durkheim (_Division du travail social_), and, more recently, by Dr. Lagerborg, in his interesting essay, 'La nature de la morale' (_Revue internationale de Sociologie_, xi. 466). Prof. Durkheim argues (p. 30) that it would be "contraire à toute méthode" to include under the same heading acts which are obligatory and acts which are objects of admiration, and at the same time exempt from all regulation. "Si donc, pour rester fidèle à l'usage, on réserve aux premiers la qualification de moraux, on ne saurait la donner également aux seconds." But I fail to see that ordinary usage recognises regulation as the test of morality. On the contrary, terms like "goodness" and "virtue," though having no reference whatever to any moral rule, have always hitherto been applied to qualities avowedly moral.]