There has been much discussion about the relation between virtue and duty. It has been said that "they are co-extensive, the former describing conduct by the quality of the agent's mind, the latter by the nature of the act performed";[29] that they express the same ideal, virtue subjectively, duty objectively;[30] or that virtue, in its proper sense, is "the quality of character that fits for the discharge of duty," and that it "only lives in the performance of duty."[31] At the same time it is admitted that "the distinctive mark of virtue seems to lie in what is beyond duty," and that "though every virtue is a duty, and every duty a virtue, there are certain actions to which it is more natural to apply the term virtuous."[32] Prof. Sidgwick, again, in his elaborate chapter on 'Virtue and Duty,' remarks that he has "thought it best to employ the terms so that virtuous conduct may include the performance of duty as well as whatever good actions may be commonly thought to go beyond duty; though recognising that virtue in its ordinary use is most conspicuously manifested in the latter."[33] [Footnote 29: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 244.] [Footnote 30: Grote, _Treatise on the Moral Ideals_, p. 22. _Cf._ Seth, _Study of Ethical Principles_, p. 239.] [Footnote 31: Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, p. 190 n.*] [Footnote 32: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 243 _sq._] [Footnote 33: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 221.] It can be no matter of surprise that those who regard the notion of "duty" as incapable of being analysed, or {150} who fail to recognise its true import, are embarrassed by its relation to virtue. We do not call it a virtue if a man habitually abstains from killing or robbing, or pays his debts, or performs a great number of other duties. We do call chastity and temperance and justice virtues, although we regard it as obligatory on a man to be chaste, temperate, just. We also call hospitality, generosity, and charity virtues in cases where they go beyond the strict limits of duty. "The relation of virtue and duty is complicated," says Professor Alexander.[34] "In its common use each term seems to include something excluded from the other," observes Professor Sidgwick.[35] But, indeed, the relation is not complicated, for there is no other intrinsic relation between them than their common antagonism to "wrong." That something is a duty implies that its non-performance tends to evoke moral indignation, that it is a virtue implies that its performance tends to evoke moral approval. That the virtues actually cover a comparatively large field of the province of duty is simply owing to their being dispositions of mind. We may praise the habits of justice and gratitude, even though we find nothing praiseworthy in an isolated just or grateful act. [Footnote 34: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 244.] [Footnote 35: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 219.]