Those who deny the existence of anything morally "praiseworthy" which is not a duty, are also generally liable to deny the existence of anything morally _indifferent_ in the conduct of responsible beings. The "super-obligatory" and the "indifferent" have this in common, that they are "ultra-obligatory," and the denial of the one as well as of the other is an expression of the same tendency to look upon the moral law as the sole fact of the moral consciousness. Even Utilitarianism cannot consistently admit of anything indifferent within the province of moral valuation, since two opposite modes of conduct can hardly produce absolutely the same sum of happiness. Such a repudiation of the "indifferent" being quite contrary to the morality of common sense, which, after all, no ethical theory can afford to neglect, considerable ingenuity has been wasted on vain attempts to show that the "indifferent" is nothing but a rude popular conception unable to keep its ground against a thoroughgoing examination. Professor Ziegler ironically asks:--"Such outward matters as eating and drinking are surely morally indifferent? And yet is eating and drinking too much, is spending too much time in outdoor exercise, is lounging idly about, morally indifferent? or, on the other hand, is it morally allowable or wholesome to reduce oneself and make oneself weak and ill by fasting, or to become a hypochondriac by continually staying indoors?"[40] This argument, however, involves a confusion of different volitions. The fact that eating or drinking generally, or eating or drinking too much or too little, are no matters of indifference, surely does not prevent {155} eating or drinking on some certain occasion from being indifferent. Mr. Bradley again observes:--"It is right and a duty that the sphere of indifferent detail should exist. It is a duty that I should develop my nature by private choice therein. Therefore, _because_ that is a duty, it is a duty _not_ to make a duty of every detail; and thus in every detail I have done my duty."[41] This statement also shows a curious confusion of entirely different facts. It may be very true that it is a duty to recognise certain actions as indifferent. This is one thing by itself. But it is quite another thing to perform those actions. And if it is a duty to recognise certain actions as indifferent how could it possibly at the same time be held a duty to perform them? [Footnote 40: Ziegler, _op. cit._ p. 85.] [Footnote 41: Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, p. 195, n. 1.]