{159} We have seen that a custom, in the strict sense of the word, is not merely the habit of a certain circle of men, but at the same time involves a moral rule. There is a close connection between these two characteristics of custom: its habitualness and its obligatoriness. Whatever be the foundation for a certain practice, and however trivial it may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency to disapprove of any deviation from it for the simple reason that such a deviation is unusual. As Abraham Tucker observes, "it is a constant argument among the common people, that a thing must be done, and ought to be done, because it always has been done."[1] Children show respect for the customary,[2] and so do savages. "If you ask a Kaffir why he does so and so, he will answer--'How can I tell? It has always been done by our forefathers.'"[3] The only reason which the Eskimo can give for some of their present customs, to which they adhere from fear of ill report among their people, is that "the old Innuits did so, and therefore they must."[4] In the behaviour of the Aleut, who "is bashful if caught doing anything unusual among his people,"[5] and in the average European's dread of appearing singular, we recognise the influence of the same force of habit. [Footnote 1: Tucker, _Light of Nature_, ii. 593. _Cf._ also Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 65 _sqq._] [Footnote 2: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 280 _sq._] [Footnote 3: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 146.] [Footnote 4: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 569.] [Footnote 5: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 396.] On the other hand, it should be remembered that not every public habit is a custom, involving an obligation; certain practices, though very general in a society, may even be reprobated by almost every one of its members. The habits of a people must therefore be handled with discretion by the student of moral ideas. Yet when he has no reason to conclude as to some special habit that it is held obligatory, he may, probably always, be sure that it is either allowed, or, in spite of all assurances of its wickedness, that the disapproval of it is not generally very deep or genuine. In a community where lying is a {160} prevailing vice, truthfulness cannot be regarded as a very sacred duty; and where sexual immorality is widely spread, the public condemnation of it always smacks of hypocrisy. Men's standard of morality is not independent of their practice. The conscience of a community follows the same rule as the conscience of an individual. "Commit a sin twice," says the Talmud, "and you will think it perfectly allowable."[6] Hence for the study of the inmost convictions of a nation, its "bad habits" form a valuable complement to its professed opinions. [Footnote 6: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58.]