Finally, the moral ideas which are expressed in the customs of a certain circle of men are not necessarily shared by every one of its members. This may, in the present connection, be considered a matter of slight importance by him who regards morality as "objectively" realised in the customs of a people, and who denies the individual the right to a private conscience. But from the subjective point of view which I am vindicating, individual conviction has a claim to equal consideration with public opinion, nay frequently, to higher respect, representing as it does in many cases a higher morality, a moral standard more purified by reflection and impartiality. At the lower stages of civilisation, however, where a man is led by his feelings more than by his thoughts, such a differentiation of moral ideas hardly occurs. The opinions of the many are the opinions of all, and the customs of a society are recognised as rules of duty by all its members. In primitive society custom stands for law, and even where social organisation has made some progress it may still remain the sole rule for conduct.[7] The authority of {162} a chief does not necessarily involve a power to make laws. Even kings who are described as autocrats may be as much tied by custom as is any of their subjects. [Footnote 7: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 170. Dall, _op. cit._ p. 381 (Tuski). Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, p. 95. Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country_, p. 101 _sq._ Holden, _Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_, p. 336. Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, p. 16. Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xiv. 39. Earl, _Papuans_, p. 105 (Arru Islanders). Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 473 (Timorese). Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 51 (Manipuris). Rockhill, _Land of the Lamas_, p. 220 (Eastern Tibetans).]