It might be absurd to bring forward the nihilist's non-intention as an extenuation of his crime; but it would hardly be correct to say that he intended the death of other passengers, besides that of the emperor, when he only intended the destruction of the train, though this intention involved an extreme disregard of the various consequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly exposed the passengers to great danger; but if we speak of an intention on his part to expose them to such a danger, we regard this exposure as an act by itself. [Footnote 5: Butler, 'Dissertation II. Of the Nature of Virtue,' in _Analogy of Religion, &c._ p. 336.] [Footnote 6: Mackenzie, _op. cit._ p. 60. The example is borrowed from Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 27 note.] [Footnote 7: Mackenzie, _op. cit._ p. 61. _Cf._ Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 202, n. 1.] [Footnote 8: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 202, n. 1. On the subject of "indirect intention," _cf._ also Bentham, _op. cit._ pp. 84, 86.] A moral judgment may refer to a mere intention, independently of its being realised or not. Moreover, the moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention. In this point moralists of all schools seem to agree.[9] Even Stuart Mill, who drew so sharp a distinction between the morality of the act and the moral worth of the agent, admits that "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention."[10] The event is of moral importance only in so far as it indicates a decision which is final. From the moral point of view there may be a considerable difference between a resolution to do a certain thing in a distant future and a resolution to do it immediately. However determined a person may be to commit a crime, or to perform a good deed, the idea of the immediacy of the event may, in the last moment, induce him to change his mind. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." External events are generally the direct causes of our moral emotions; indeed, without the _doing_ of harm and the _doing_ of good, the moral consciousness would never {206} have come into existence. Hence the ineradicable tendency to pass moral judgments upon acts, even though they really relate to the final intentions involved in acts. It would be both inconvenient and useless to deviate, in this respect, from the established application of terms. And no misunderstanding can arise from such application if it be borne in mind that by an "act," as the subject of a moral judgment, is invariably understood the event _plus_ the intention which produced it, and that the very same moral judgment as is passed on acts would also, on due reflection, be recognised as valid with reference to final decisions in cases where accidental circumstances prevented the accomplishment of the act. [Footnote 9: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 201.] [Footnote 10: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 27 note. _Cf._ James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 376.]