is true that our detestation of an act is not always proportionate to our moral condemnation of the agent; people do terrible things in ignorance. But our detestation of an act is, properly speaking, a moral emotion only in so far as it is directed against him who committed the act, in his capacity of a moral agent. We are struck with horror when we hear of a wolf eating a child, but we do not morally condemn the wolf. [Footnote 13: _Cf._ James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 376; Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 364.] [Footnote 14: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 26.] [Footnote 15: _Ibid._ p. 26.] A volition may have reference not only to the doing of a thing, but to the abstaining from doing a thing. It may form part not only of an act, but of a forbearance. A forbearance is morally equivalent to an act, and the volition involved in it is equivalent to an intention. "Sitting still, or holding one's peace," says Locke, "when walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their consequences as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for actions too."[16] Yet it is hardly correct to call them acts. Bentham's division of acts into acts of commission {210} and acts of omission or forbearance[17] is not to be recommended. A not-doing I do not call an act, and the purpose of not doing I do not call an intention.[18] But the fact remains that a forbearance involves a distinct volition, which, as such, may be the subject of moral judgment no less than the intention involved in an act. [Footnote 16: Locke, _op. cit._ ii. 21, 28 (_Philosophical Works_, p. 218).] [Footnote 17: Bentham, _op. cit._ p. 72.] [Footnote 18: _Cf._ Clark, _Analysis of Criminal Liability_, p. 42.]