All these various elements into which the subjects of moral judgments may be resolved, are included in the term "conduct." By a man's conduct in a certain case is understood a volition, or the absence of a volition in him--which is often, but not always or necessarily, expressed in an act, forbearance, or omission--viewed with reference to all such circumstances as may influence its moral character. In order to form an accurate idea of these circumstances, it is necessary to consider not only the case itself, but the man's character, if by character is understood a person's will regarded as a continuous entity.[26] The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions; and, since a man's will or character is a continuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed upon him in a particular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his character. We impute a person's acts to _him_ only in so far as we regard them as a result or manifestation of his character, as directly or indirectly due to his will. Hume observes:--"Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some _cause_ in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. . . . The person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded {215} from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance."[27] There is thus an intimate connection between character and conduct as subjects of moral valuation. When judging of a man's conduct in a special instance, we judge of his character, and when judging of his character, we judge of his conduct in general. [Footnote 26: _Cf._ Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 49: "Character is simply that of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation." To the word "character" has also been given a broader meaning. According to John Grote (_Treatise on the Moral Ideals_, p. 442), a person's character "is his habitual way of thinking, feeling, and acting."] [Footnote 27: Hume, _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_, viii. 2 (_Philosophical Works_, iv. 80). _Cf._ _Idem_, _Treatise of Human Nature_, iii. 2 (_ibid._ ii. 191). See also Schopenhauer, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_ (_Sämmtliche Werke_, vol. vii.), pp. 123, 124, 281.]