Whilst the grossest want of discrimination may thus be explained from revengeful feelings and superstitious beliefs, there still remain a multitude of cases which must be regarded as genuine expressions of moral indignation. As to these, it should, first, be remembered that even the reflecting moral consciousness may hold a person blamable for the unintentional and unforeseen infliction of an injury, namely, in cases where it assumes want of proper foresight. Now, as we know, it is often difficult enough to discern whether, or to what extent, an unintended injury is due to carelessness on the part of the agent; sometimes even it is no easy thing to tell whether an injury was intended or not. It is not to be expected, then, that distinctions of so subtle a nature should be properly made by the uncultured mind, and least of all is it to be expected that such distinctions should be embodied in early custom and law, which are based on average cases and allow of no minute individualisation. It has been observed that the roughness of Teutonic justice may be partly explained from the difficulty in getting any proof of intention or of its absence, from the lack of any proper distinctions between {236} misadventure and carelessness, and from the fact that the so-called misadventures of early times covered many a blameworthy act.[115] And all this holds good not merely of the ancient Teutons. It may further be said that the more defective the power of discrimination, the greater is the tendency to presume guilt. In Morocco a man who runs away after killing another is presumed to have committed the deed intentionally, however innocent he really may be. Among the Teutons the presumption was always against the manslayer; he had to proclaim what he had done, and to prove that the deed was not intended[116]--unless, indeed, the misadventure belonged to a certain type of injuries which by their very nature entailed no guilt. For instance, if a man carried a spear level on his shoulder and another ran upon the point, he was free from blame; whereas, if harm ensued by pure accident from a distinct act, the agent was liable.[117] As von Amira remarks, the Swedish notion of _vadhaværk_ was not a merely negative conception, but implied that there was danger connected with the act.[118] [Footnote 115: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ i. 55; ii. 475, 483. von Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_, i. 377 _sq._] [Footnote 116: Wilda, _op. cit._ i. 345. Brunner, _Forschungen_, p. 500 _sq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 471.] [Footnote 117: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 584. Trummer, _op. cit._ i. 427. Brunner, _Forschungen_, p. 499 _sq._ von Amira, 'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii. pt. ii. 172. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ i. 53 _sq._] [Footnote 118: von Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_, i. 377.]