tempest."[89] Moreover, if a boy under fourteen fell from a cart, or from a horse, it was {264} no deodand, "because he was not of discretion to look to himself," and so the cart, or horse, could not be regarded as blamable. But if a cart ran over a boy, or a tree fell upon him, or a bull gored him, it was deodand, because, apparently, it went out of its way to kill him.[90] The fact of motion was one of considerable importance in the case of animals and inanimate things, as it was in the case of men. Thus Bracton would distinguish between the horse which throws a man and the horse off which a man tumbles, between the tree that falls and the tree against which a man is thrown; and, as a general rule, a thing was not a deodand unless it could be said "movere ad mortem."[91] If anybody was drowned by falling from a ship under sail, not only the ship itself but the things moving in it were deemed the cause of his death; whereas the merchandise lying at the bottom of the vessel was not presumed to be guilty, and consequently was not forfeited.[92] But if any particular merchandise fell upon a person and caused his death, that merchandise became a deodand, and not the ship.[93] As Mr. Holmes observes, a ship is the most persistent example of motion giving personality to a thing. "She" is still personified not only in common parlance, but in courts of justice. In maritime cases of quite recent date judges of great repute have pronounced the proceeding to be, not against the owner, but "against the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel."[94] [Footnote 78: _Lex Ripuariorum_, lxx. 1.] [Footnote 79: Liebrccht, _Zur Volkskund_, p. 313.] [Footnote 80: Salvado, _Mémoires historiques sur l'Australie_, p. 260 _sq._] [Footnote 81: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 213 _sq._] [Footnote 82: _Cf._ Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man_, i. 125; Hall, 'Study of Anger,' in _American Journal of Psychology_, x. 506 _sq._] [Footnote 83: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 354.] [Footnote 84: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 169 _sqq._] [Footnote 85: Pausanias, i. 28. 11.] [Footnote 86: Pollock and Maitland, ii. 474.] [Footnote 87: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ_, fol. 116, vol. ii. 236 _sq._] [Footnote 88: Holmes, _Common Law_, p. 25.] [Footnote 89: Bracton, _op. cit._ fol. 122, vol. ii. 286 _sq._ Coke, _op. cit._ p. 58. Sir James Stephen supposes (_op. cit._ iii. 78) that "deodands were not in use at sea, because the local customs of England did not extend to the high seas." But Coke expressly says (p. 58) that there can be no deodand of the ship even "in _aqua salsa_, being any arm of the sea, though it be in the body of the County."] [Footnote 90: Coke, _op. cit._ p. 57. Hale, _History of the Pleas of the Crown_, i. 422. Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 78.]