The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
[Footnote 211: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 165.
Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 81 _sq._]
[Footnote 212: _Cf._ Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._
xi. 424.]
[Footnote 213: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iii. 5. 8.]
[Footnote 214: Damhouder, _Praxis rerum criminalium_, lxxxiv. 20,
p. 241.]
[Footnote 215: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, _op. cit._ xii. 527.]
[Footnote 216: Giles, _op. cit._ ii. 30.]
CHAPTER XI
MOTIVES
NO enlightened and conscientious moral judge can regard his judgment
as final, unless he know the motive, or motives, of the volition by
which his judgment is occasioned. But in ordinary moral estimates
little attention is paid to motives. Men desire that certain acts
should be performed, and that certain other acts should be abstained
from. The conative causes of acts or forbearances are not equally
interesting, and they are often hidden. They are considered only in
proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection.
Take, for instance, acts which are performed from a sense of duty. It
is commonly said that a person ought to obey his conscience. Yet, in
point of fact, by doing so he may expose himself to hardly less
censure than does the greatest villain. The reason for this is not far
to seek. A man's moral conviction is to some extent an expression of
his character, hence he may be justly blamed for having a certain
moral conviction. And the blame which he may deserve on that account
is easily exaggerated, partly because people are apt to be very
intolerant concerning opinions of right and wrong which differ from
their own, partly owing to the influence which external events
exercise upon their minds.
Somewhat greater discrimination is shown in regard to motives
consisting of powerful non-volitional conations which in no way
represent the agent's character, but to which {284} he yields
reluctantly, or by which he is carried away on the spur of the moment.
In many such cases even the law--which regards it as no excuse if a
person commits a crime from a feeling of duty[1]--displays more or
less indulgence to the perpetrator of a harmful deed.
[Footnote 1: _Cf._ the case Reg. _v._ Morby, _Law Reports, Cases
determined in the Queen's Bench Division_, viii. 571 _sqq._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account