The cognitions by which non-moral resentment and gratitude are determined are thus, as regards their general nature, precisely similar to those which determine moral indignation and approval. Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain. This solves a problem which necessarily baffles solution in the hands of those who fail to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments, and which, when considered at all, has, I think, never been fully understood by those who have essayed it. It has been argued, for instance, that moral praise and blame are not applied to inanimate things and those who commit involuntary deeds, because they are administered only "where they are capable of producing some effect";[15] that moral judgment is concerned with the question of compulsion, because "only when a man acts morally of his own free will is society sure of him";[16] that we do not regard a lunatic as responsible, because we know that "his mind is so diseased that it is impossible by moral reprobation alone to change his character so that it maybe subsequently relied upon."[17] The bestowal of moral praise or blame on such or such an object is thus attributed to utilitarian calculation;[18] whereas in reality it is determined by the nature of the moral emotion which lies at the bottom of the judgment. And, as Stuart Mill observes (though he never seems to have realised the full import of his objection), whilst we may administer praise and blame with the express design of influencing conduct, "no anticipation of salutary effects {320} from our feeling will ever avail to give us the feeling itself."[19] [Footnote 15: James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 370.] [Footnote 16: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 56 _sq._] [Footnote 17: Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, p. 296.] [Footnote 18: See also James Mill, _op. cit._ pp. 261, 262, 375.] [Footnote 19: Stuart Mill, in a note to James Mill's _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_, ii. 323.] * * * * *