acts in future."[25] [Footnote 20: Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, p. 285.] [Footnote 21: Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 41 _sq._] [Footnote 22: Balfour, _Foundations of Belief_, p. 25.] [Footnote 23: Stuart Mill, _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, p. 506.] [Footnote 24: _Ibid._ p. 506 _sqq._] [Footnote 25: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 71 _sq._] If these conclusions are correct it is obvious that, whether the infliction of punishment be justifiable or not, the _feeling_ of moral indignation or moral approval is, from the deterministic point of view, absurd. And yet, as a matter of fact, these emotions are felt by determinists and libertarians alike. Apparently, they are not in the least affected by the notion that the human will is subject to the general law of cause and effect. Emotions are always determined by specific cognitions, and last only as long as the influence of those cognitions lasts. It makes me sorry to hear that some evil has befallen a friend; but my sorrow disappears at once when I find that the rumour was false. I get angry with a person who hurts me; but my anger subsides as soon as I recognise that the hurt was purely accidental. My indignation is aroused by an {322} atrocious crime; but it ceases entirely when I hear that the agent was mad. On the other hand, however convinced I am that a person's conduct and character are in every detail a product of causes, that does not prevent me from feeling towards him retributive emotions--either anger or gratitude, or moral resentment or approval. Hence I conclude that a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will. I hold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else, because they think themselves to be free.[26] And I attribute the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism either to a failure to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments or to insufficient insight into the true nature of the moral emotions. At the same time it seems easy to explain the fallacy which lies at the bottom of that conception. [Footnote 26: Spinoza, _Ethica_, iii. 49, Note.] We have seen that the object of moral approval and disapproval is the will, and that a person's responsibility is lessened in proportion as his will is exposed to the pressure of non-volitional conations. Full responsibility thus presupposes freedom from such pressure, and, particularly, freedom from external compulsion. Hence the inference that it also presupposes freedom from causation, and that complete determination involves complete irresponsibility. Compulsion is confounded with causation; and this confusion is due to the fact that the cause which determines the will is actually looked upon in the light of a constraining power outside the will.