[Footnote 28: In a Pahlavi text fate is defined as "that which is ordained from the beginning," and divine providence as that which the sacred beings "also grant otherwise" (_Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxiv. 6 _sq._).] [Footnote 29: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 6.] [Footnote 30: Burton, in his translation of the _Arabian Nights_, i. 62, n. 2.] [Footnote 31: Hyltén-Cavallius, _Wärend och Wirdarne_, i. 206.] [Footnote 32: _Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad_, xxiii. 3 _sqq._] Nor is it only the popular mind that, when human volitions are concerned, interprets causation as compulsion. Even such philosophers as Hamilton[33] and Mansel[34] seemed quite unable to distinguish between determinism and fatalism. Professor Laurie likewise observes:--"Determinism is the term adopted of late years to veil fatalism and confound issues . . . . Freedom or fate, these are the sole alternatives."[35] Surely, it is those who identify determinism with fatalism that "confound issues." And a similar confusion lurks behind the main argument which has been adduced in support of free-will. It is said that "I ought" implies "I can," and that men are not accountable for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true if by "cannot" is meant compulsion, and by "can" freedom from compulsion. But it is certainly not true if "I can" is intended to mean that "I" am a first cause, not determined by anything else. [Footnote 33: Hamilton, _Lectures on Metaphysics_, ii. 410 _sqq._] [Footnote 34: Mansel, _Prolegomena Logica_, p. 329 _sqq._] [Footnote 35: Laurie, _Ethica_, pp. 307, 319.] When a person's will is believed to be constrained by a power outside him, he can obviously not be held responsible for what he does under the influence of such constraint. We are responsible only for that which is due to our will. A licentious man who has grown up in a corrupt society is less blamable than an equally licentious man who has always lived under conditions favourable to virtue; and if we hear of a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by a band of pickpockets and trained to their profession, we {325} no doubt look upon him with some indulgence. In these cases, however, it may be said that, though the person's conduct is largely due to the influence of external circumstances upon his will, this influence was not irresistible, that he might have saved himself with an effort of will, and that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But in the case of a restraining destiny no escape is possible; the compulsion is complete. Hence the logical outcome of radical fatalism is a denial of all moral imputability, and a repudiation of all moral judgment.[36]