The Origin of Man and of His SuperstitionsRead, Carveth
Philosophy
The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions
Read, Carveth
Animism; Human beings -- Origin; Magic; Superstition; Totemism
(_c_) The causes determining belief are reinforced in various ways
by feeling and emotion. The agreeableness or disagreeableness of any
judgment draws attention to, or diverts it from such a judgment and the
evidence for it: except that some disagreeable emotions, especially
fear, by a sort of fascination of attention, are favourable to belief
in the reality of an imagined evil. They possess the whole mind.
(_d_) Every desire fixes attention upon beliefs favourable to it,
and upon any evidence favourable to them, and diverts attention from
conflicting beliefs and considerations. Thus every desire readily forms
about itself a relatively isolated mass of beliefs, which resists
comparison and, therefore (as Ribot says),[87] does not recognise the
principle of contradiction. Incompatible desires may be cherished
without our becoming aware of their incompatibility; or, if the fact
obtrudes itself upon us, we repudiate it and turn away.
The more immature a mind, again, and the less knowledge it has, the
less inhibition of desire is exerted by foresight of consequences that
ought to awaken conflicting desires or fears; and the less compassion
one has, the less is desire inhibited by its probable consequences to
others: therefore, in both cases, the less check there is upon belief.
(_e_) Voluntary action in connection with any belief, whether of a
rational kind or in the routine of rites and ceremonies, favours that
belief: (1) by establishing the idea-circuit of means and end, the
end suggesting the means to it, and the thought of means running
forward to the end—a circuit that resists interruption: (2) by the
general effect of habit and prejudice; for every habit of action or of
thought has inertia, and, moreover, it is agreeable, and to break it is
disagreeable; so that, again, a relatively isolated system is formed,
which resists comparison and criticism.
On the influence of desire and of activities for an end depends “the
will to believe.” We cannot believe anything by directly willing it;
but we can will what to attend to, or what to do, and that determines
belief.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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