The Origin of Man and of His SuperstitionsRead, Carveth
Philosophy
The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions
Read, Carveth
Animism; Human beings -- Origin; Magic; Superstition; Totemism
The syllogism (it is now admitted) does not describe the way in which
we reason, but is only a form which gives some help in testing the
validity of reasoning if one should ever think of doing such a thing.
In practice we do not think first of the major premise, then of the
minor premise and lastly of the conclusion. As a rule we do not think
of either premise at all: the “conclusion” comes first to mind. In
certain circumstances of association, because of our hopes or our
fears, it occurs to us that “Socrates is mortal.” If some one should
doubt this judgment and ask for proof, we might think of the major
premise, and then put it into words for the first time—“All men die;”
even then it might not seem necessary to add that “Socrates is a man.”
But although we may not have been at the time aware of these premises
until we were asked for them, their presence in the mind in some way
was necessary to determine the inference: the major premise was there
as latent memory of one or more cases of people who had died; the minor
premise was represented by the assimilation of the case of Socrates to
those cases of mortal men. The former experiences have left an engram,
which serves as a mould into which subsequent experience may run, and
which conceivably may determine subsequent judgments even though the
former experiences can no longer be remembered.
The phrase “form of thought” is most used for premises of high
generality, such as the axioms of mathematics, causation, substance
and attribute, space in three dimensions; and, undoubtedly, these are
forms which determine the lines of all thinking to which they are
relevant; but they would be useless, if there were not, under them,
forms established in very concrete material by the repetition of simple
experiences and ordinary events (or even by single impressive events),
such as “men are mortal,” “water quenches fire,” which determine the
lines of common-sense judgments. If there has been an experiential
judgment—X is related to Y, when X again appears it is expected to be
related to Y.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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