There is much here that calls for criticism. When ideas are mentioned which mutually exclude one another it may well be asked what kind of ideas these are? According to another utterance of Mill’s (vol. i. p. 98 seq. note 30 and elsewhere), he knows “no case of absolute incompatibility of thought except between the thought of the presence of something and that of its absence.” But are even these incompatible? Mill himself teaches elsewhere the very opposite when he thinks that along with the idea of existence there is always given at the same time the idea of non-existence (p. 126, note 39; “we are only conscious,” he says, “of the presence of an object by comparison with its absence”). Apart, however, from all this, how strange is it that Mill here overlooks the fact that he abandons entirely the distinctive character of self-evidence, and retains only that blind and mechanical formation of judgment, which he rightly treats with contempt. The sceptic Hume stands in this respect far higher, since he at least sees that such an empirical (empiristisch) view of the process of induction does not satisfy the requirements of our reason. Sigwart’s criticism of Mill’s theory of Induction (_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 371) contains here much that is true, though in appealing to his postulates he has certainly not substituted anything truly satisfactory in the place of what is defective in Mill. [70] (_p. 40_). Cf. Hume, _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_, vol. ii. towards the end. [71] (_p. 40_). _Nic. Ethics_, iii. 10. Cf. the subtle discussions in the subsequent chapter on the five kinds of false courage. [72] (_p. 41_). _Nic. Ethics_, i. 2. APPENDIX I I “Subjectless propositions” so the celebrated philologer has entitled a little work which, on its first appearance, bore the title, _The Verba Impersonalia in the Slav Languages_. The change of name may well be connected with considerable additions in the second edition. The new designation would, however, even in the earlier form, have been the more suitable title. For, far from treating the special nature of merely _one_ family of languages, the author sets up a theory of wide-reaching significance, which, while contradicting the prevailing view, only deserves all the more on this account general attention. Not only philology, but also psychology and metaphysics have an interest in the problem. Moreover, the new doctrine promised to bring profit not only to the inquirer in these lofty spheres but also to the schoolboy at present tortured by the school-master with impossible and incomprehensible theories (cf. p. 23 seq.).