When, however, we now say: “es fehlt an Geld,” the meaning must therefore be: “das Fehlen an Geld fehlt an Geld.” But this is absurd. It was therefore explained that the subject here is “Geld,” and the meaning of the proposition is: “Geld fehlt an Geld.” Closely examined, this would seem to strike a blow at the wished-for unity of explanation. If, however, by closing one eye, the failure here may be partially ignored, even this is useless when we stumble upon propositions like: “es giebt einen Gott,” respecting which we arrive at no satisfactory meaning either in the proposition: “das einen Gott geben giebt einen Gott; das Geben giebt einen Gott,” or in the proposition, “Gott giebt einen Gott.” It was therefore necessary to look for an explanation of an entirely different character. But where was such an explanation to be found? And even if ingenuity were here able to hit upon some expedient, what availed such leaping from case to case, which could only be called the caricature of a truly scientific explanation? Not a single designation of the subject which has been so far suggested, can be termed suitable, unless indeed it be a saying of Schleiermacher’s. For if this philosopher (cf. p. 16) has really asserted that the subject in such cases is _chaos_, this utterance must be regarded, not so much as an attempt at explanation as rather a satire upon the hypotheses hitherto set up by philologists. Many inquirers are therefore of opinion that the real subjects of such propositions as: it rains, it lightens, have, up to the present time, not been discovered, and that even at the present time it is the business of science to find them. But, would it not be strange if the tracing of a subject, which is thought of by everyone, and which, though unexpressed, forms the basis of the judgment, should yet offer such extraordinary difficulties? Steinthal seeks to explain this by saying that by the grammatical subject something is suggested, which is yet unthinkable. But many will reply with Miklosich (p. 23): “We would not, I think, be going too far in asserting that grammar is not concerned with the unthinkable.” The totality of the phenomena and the absolutely grotesque failure of every attempt to determine the nature of the subject, however often and however ingeniously this has been attempted, are the chief grounds on which Miklosich bases his assertion that, generally speaking, the supposed subject in the case of such propositions is a delusion, that the proposition is no combination of subject and predicate, that, as Miklosich expresses it, the proposition is subjectless.