The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiryHirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Philosophy
The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiry
Hirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Aesthetics; Art -- Philosophy; Art, Primitive
All these impulses, accompanied by higher or lower degrees of conscious
endeavour, are psychical phenomena of fundamental importance. They are
not restricted to any particular stage of culture. And their coercive
force is equal—nay, even superior to that of the imitative impulse, the
play-impulse, and the impulse “to attract by pleasing.” If we could
deduce the desire for artistic creation from the activities connected
with feeling, we should here find the explanation of its universality
as well as of its force.
But among the manifestations described in the foregoing chapters
there is none which directly leads us to the artistic activity. As
against the _Spieltrieb_ theories it was objected that play never
develops of itself into art, so it may now be objected, with as much
reason, that all immediate or secondary emotional manifestations,
however interesting they may be, give us no information on artistic
manifestations. The instinctive tendency to express overmastering
feeling, to enhance pleasure, and to seek relief from pain, forms the
most deep-seated motive of all human activity. We can therefore derive
the distinctive qualities of artistic production from this impulse only
when it has been proved that art is better able than any other kind of
mental function to serve and satisfy the requirements which arise from
this impulse when it occurs in its purest form.
That this is the case, is the fundamental hypothesis upon which this
work is based. It was impossible to prove its validity as long as
emotional manifestations were treated as phenomena in the psychical
life of the individual. For art is in its innermost nature a social
activity. In order to elucidate the connection between art-impulse
and emotional activities, we must therefore examine the latter as
they appear in the social relations of mankind. We do not believe
that any new principles are necessary for this purpose. We need only
apply to social phenomena the same laws which were found to be valid
for the emotional life of the individual. As, however, the legitimacy
of such a course may be questioned, we must first devote some pages
to a treatment of what we may call—if the expression is allowed—the
interindividual life.
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